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TINKERING WITH THE MACHINERY OF DEATH:' AN
EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF STATE INDIGENT
DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
DEATH-ELIGIBLE DEFENDANTS
In the midst of the firestorm of disagreement and debate fo-
cused on the wisdom and effectiveness of the death penalty,
critics and supporters of the death penalty agree on one thing:
the system for providing representation to indigent death-eligi-
ble defendants is badly flawed and does not function properly 2
During recent years, those who work within the death penalty
system and those who preside over it have voiced systemic criti-
cisms of the death penalty 3 Justice Blackmun's recent dissent
in McFarland v. Scott4 demonstrates that these systemic criti-
cisms have become as forceful as arguments about the philo-
sophical and moral underpinmngs of the death penalty itself. In
his dissenting opimon, Justice Blackmun noted his belief that
the judiciary is not meeting its constitutional requirement of
providing competent counsel to death-eligible defendants and
that the death penalty cannot be fairly imposed under the pres-
ent system.5
1. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.").
2. See Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on Recent
Proposals To Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1665, 1673
(1990).
3. See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not
for the Worst Cnrme but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) (arguing
that the quality of legal representation is often the deciding factor in whether a
defendant receives the death penalty); Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the Death
Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1986) (discussing the belief that defendants in capital cases are not given an ade-
quate opportunity to defend themselves).
4. 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2785 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
5. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated:
When we execute a capital defendant in this country, we rely on the
belief that the individual was guilty, and was convicted and sentenced
after a fair trial, to justify the imposition of state-sponsored killing.
My 24 years of overseeing the imposition of the death penalty from this
Court have left me in grave doubt whether this reliance is justified and
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During the past several years, Congress has focused its atten-
tion on reforming the habeas corpus process to eliminate lengthy
delays.6 The result is the recent passage by the House of Repre-
sentatives of the Effective Death Penalty Act of 1995, which
purports to reform the habeas corpus review process. Although
the problems that exist in the habeas corpus process are widely
acknowledged, these problems are often caused by the inade-
quate representation of indigent defendants at the trial level.'
This Note urges reformers to focus their efforts on providing
better representation at the trial stage instead of limiting
postconviction review
Although no one state indigent defense system can absolutely
guarantee that a defendant will receive the effective assistance
of counsel mandated by the Sixth Amendment, this Note argues
that existing state indigent defense systems are flawed and that
states should reform these systems by establishing capital trial
units to provide specialized legal representation to all indigent
capital defendants. The first section of this Note outlines the
scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The second sec-
tion examines Congress's recent death penalty reforms and dis-
cusses why they will not improve the system. The third section
then examines the different types of systems that states have
established to provide defense services to indigent capital defen-
dants and details the problems that those systems have experi-
enced. The fourth section explains how the implementation of
alternative systems, such as capital trial units and qualification
standards for capital counsel, can improve the performance of
whether the constitutional requirement of competent legal counsel for
capital defendants is being fulfilled. It is my hope and belief that this
Nation soon will come to realize that capital pumshment cannot morally
or constitutionally be imposed. Until that time, however, we must have
the courage to recognize the failings of our present system of capital
representation and the conviction to do what is necessary to improve it.
Id. at 2790 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. See Berger, supra note 2, at 1665-69 (describing the problem of delayed execu-
tions and the recommendations made to reduce delays).
7. H.R. 729, 104th Cong., ist Sess. (1995).
8. TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, TO-
WARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY
CASES, reprinted in 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1990) [hereinafter TASK FORCE
REPORT].
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state indigent defense systems with respect to their defense of
capital defendants. Finally, the fifth section examines the possi-
bility of federal legislation mandating the use of capital trial
units or, in the alternative, imposition of such a system by the
judiciary
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."9 In
1932, the Supreme Court held in Powell v. Alabama"0 that this
right included the right of indigent defendants who are inca-
pable of defending themselves to have counsel appointed without
cost in capital cases.' Not until 1963, in Gideon v. Wan-
wright,2 did the Court decide to extend the right to counsel
without cost to all indigent defendants charged with a felony 13
In that same year, the Court held that the states must provide
counsel to indigent defendants on their first appeal of right. 4
The right to counsel continued to expand in 1972, when the
Court declared in Argersinger v. Hamlin"5 that an indigent's
right to appointed counsel extends to defendants charged with a
misdemeanor who are in danger of losing their liberty 16
Although the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel requires the appointment of counsel at the
trial level,'7 it has not found that the states are constitutionally
required to provide indigent defendants with counsel during
postconviction proceedings. 8 Congress, however, has enacted a
statute that provides for the appointment of counsel to represent
an indigent capital defendant in federal postconviction proceed-
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
11. Id. at 71-73.
12. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
13. Id. at 344-45.
14. Douglas v. Califorma, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
15. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
16. Id. at 37.
17. Id., Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45.
18. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 4 (1989).
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ngs. 9 Recently, the Court held, in McFarland v. Scott," that
a federal district court has the power to appoint an attorney to
represent an indigent capital petitioner even though the capital
petitioner has not yet filed a petition in federal court.2
In addition to explaimng when states must provide represen-
tation to indigent defendants, the Court also has commented
extensively on the quality of the representation that must be
provided. The Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel." In
Strickland v. Washington,' the Court established a two-part
test to determine if an indigent defendant's representation was
ineffective.24
For a defendant to prove that he received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel at his trial, he must show that counsel's repre-
sentation was objectively unreasonable' and that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent."2 6 This test is extremely difficult to satlsfy7 because when
a court considers such a claim, it presumes that the challenged
representation was competent and uses an extremely deferential
standard of review 28 As a result, courts rarely grant ineffective
assistance claims, despite the horrific stones about incompetent
and ineffective representation in many cases.29  The definition
19. Capital defendants are entitled to appointed counsel in federal habeas corpus
proceedings initiated under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 21 U.S.C. §
848(q)(4)(B) (1994).
20. McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994).
21. Id. at 2572.
22. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
23. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
24. Id. at 687.
25. Id. at 688.
26. Id. at 694.
27. "Ten years after the articulation of [the Strickland] standard, practical expe-
rence establishes that the Strickland test, in application, has failed to protect a
defendant's right to be represented by something more than 'a person who happens
to be a lawyer.'" McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2787 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685); see also Bright, supra note 3, at
1862-66 (commenting on the inadequacy of the Strickland standard in death penalty
cases).
28. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.
29. For a detailed catalog of horror stones about incompetent counsel, see Bright,
1620
1996] STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS 1621
of the right to counsel has seen steady expansion since the Su-
preme Court first recogmzed it in Powell." The right has yet to
be extended to the postconviction level, however, and, due to the
high standard that Strickland imposes on those defendants
seeking to show that their representation at trial was incompe-
tent and ineffective, the system assumes adequate representa-
tion at the trial level." This assumption is misplaced. In many
cases, indigent defendants do not receive adequate representa-
tion at the trial level, yet their claims do not satisfy the
Strickland standard of meffectiveness. This problem is espe-
cially serious in capital cases because, without adequate repre-
sentation at the trial level, a capital defendant may lose or
waive many of his claims.3
Many commentators have argued that the Supreme Court
supra note 3; see also Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1923 (1994) (arguing that the Eighth
Amendment requires a lugher standard for competency of counsel in capital cases
because of their complexity).
30. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
31. See generally Note, supra note 29, at 1933-35 (advocating the rejection of
Strickland's standard in capital cases).
32. See, e.g., Messer v. Kemp, 474 U.S. 1088, 1089-91 (1986) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (observing that the defense counsel's failure to make an opening statement
during the guilt phase, failure to present defense evidence, failure to present miti-
gating evidence, and his repeated hints that his client should receive the death pen-
alty did not amount to ineffective assistance); Graham v. Collins, 829 F Supp. 204,
209 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that the defense counsel's failure to introduce ballistics
tests showing that the defendant's gun was not the murder weapon was not meffec-
tive assistance); Hathorn v. State, 848 S.W.2d 101, 118 (Tex. Cnn. App.) (en banc)
(finding the defense counsel's admission to the jury that his client was guilty was
not ineffective assistance of counsel because it was held to be a trial tactic), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 3062 (1993); Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350, 357-58 (Tex. Cnn.
App. 1991) (en banc) (holding that the defense counsel's failure to object to the
prosecutor's incorrect statement of the requirements for issuing a death sentence did
not prejudice the defendant), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 992 (1992).
33. McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2787 (1994) (Blackimun, J., dissenting).
The consequences of such poor trial representation for the capital defen-
dant, of course, can be lethal. Evidence not presented at trial cannot
later be discovered and introduced; arguments and objections not ad-
vanced are forever waived. Nor is a capital defendant likely to be able to
demonstrate that Ins legal counsel was ineffective, given the low standard
for acceptable attorney conduct and the high showing of prejudice re-
quired under Strickland v. Washington
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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needs to reexamine the Stnckland standard and reevaluate the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment s4 or, in the alternative,
to create a higher standard for assistance of counsel in capital
cases." Until this is done, however, capital defendants will con-
tinue to face the presumption that they were defended at trial
by competent counsel. 6 Reformers must focus on making that
presumption a reality
THE HABEAS CORPUS REFORM MOVEMENT
Both proponents and opponents of the death penalty acknowl-
edge that the system of adminstering the death penalty is
flawed and needs repair. 7 Both sides disagree, however, about
the nature of the problem and the best way to repair it."5 Death
penalty opponents have based their arguments either on moral
opposition,39 on the system's failure to provide adequate repre-
sentation to defendants at the trial level,4" or on the rigidity
and strictness of the habeas review system.4 In contrast, death
penalty proponents have argued that, for the death penalty to be
effective as a deterrent, it must be delivered as quickly as possi-
ble after conviction.42 Proponents argue that the federal and
state habeas corpus processes take too long and allow for too
much delay before an execution is carried out.43 These argu-
34. See Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of 'Counsel" in the Sixth
Amendment, 78 IowA L. REV. 433, 433 (1993) (arguing for a redefinition of "counsel"
under the Sixth Amendment to include only counsel qualified to present an adequate
defense).
35. Note, supra note 29, at 1923.
36. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
37. Berger, supra note 2, at 1673.
38. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 59-60 (describing the dif-
ferent perceptions among death penalty critics and proponents about the benefits
and evils of delay in the review process).
39. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
40. See, e.g., Bright, supra note 3, at 1835-37.
41. See Berger, supra note 2, at 1666.
42. See id. at 1668-69.
43. One of the strongest critics of the habeas process is Cluef Justice Rehnquist.
He has argued consistently that the process should be reformed to ensure that death
sentences are carried out promptly and not bogged down for years while federal
courts review state-imposed sentences. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 959-
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ments, however, are based on the premise that the additional
review of death sentences provided during habeas corpus is
unnecessary because the inmate received adequate representa-
tion at the trial level and was tried and convicted fairly To
understand why reformers should focus on the system at the
trial level, this Note will examine recent habeas corpus reform
proposals and explain why they will exacerbate the systemic
problems instead of solving them.
Recent Habeas Reform Efforts-The Effectwe Death Penalty Act
of 1995"
The habeas corpus process has engendered controversy since
its inception,45 and Congress has regularly considered reform
bills since 1953.46 Although none of the past reform bills have
passed, habeas corpus reform has become an important national
issue, and Republicans who signed the "Contract with America"
identified it as a priority 4' The most recent habeas corpus re-
form bill, The Effective Death Penalty Act of 1995, passed in the
House of Representatives on February 8, 1995, and the Senate is
currently considering similar legislation.48
The Effective Death Penalty Act, like many of its predeces-
sors, focuses on eliminating the delays caused by the habeas
review process.49 Regardless of whether the Senate approves
the House-passed habeas reform bill, it represents a continua-
tion of previous reform attempts. Indeed, it seems likely that
federal legislators will continue to propose such legislation until
they finally approve some habeas reform measure.
60 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44. H.R. 729, supra note 7.
45. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 53-54.
46. Berger, supra note 2, at 1667.
47. Naftali Bendavid, Getting Even Tougher on Crime, CONN. L. TRIB., Nov. 21,
1994, at 8.
48. H.R. 729, supra note 7; 141 CONG. REC. H1400-34 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995); see
also Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1995, S. 623, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (contaimng
the Senate's version of the Effective Death Penalty Act, which is being considered by
the Judiciary Committee).
49. For a detailed examination of previous habeas corpus bills, see Berger, supra
note 2, at 1704-14.
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The Effective Death Penalty Act consists of two sections."
Title I is entitled "Habeas Corpus Reform"; it details reforms
that will affect all prisoners filing for habeas corpus relief.5
Title II deals specifically with reforming death penalty proce-
dures."2 Under Title I, state prisoners must file any federal pe-
tition challenging their conviction within one year from the date
of the demal of habeas relief by the state court of last resort.53
In addition, the bill would require that federal prisoners seeking
to challenge their conviction file a federal petition within two
years after their direct appeal has ended.'
The bill also requires that prisoners who have had their peti-
tions demed by a federal district court receive a certificate of
probable cause from either a circuit court or a Justice of the
Supreme Court before an appeal can be granted.55 Finally, un-
der Title I, a federal district court has the authority to deny
relief on the merits even though the petitioner has not yet ex-
bausted his claim in the state courts.55
Title II focuses exclusively on reforming postconviction review
procedures in death penalty cases.5" To be eligible for the appli-
cation of these special provisions, a state must establish:
by rule of its court of last resort or by statute a mechamsm
for the appointment, compensation and payment of reason-
able litigation expenses of competent counsel in State
postconviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners
The rule of court or statute must provide standards of compe-
tency for the appointment of such counsel.5"
50. H.R. 729, supra note 7.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id., see Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearings on H.R. 729 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 Habeas Corpus Reform Hearings on H.R. 729] (statement of
Larry Yackle, Professor of Law, Boston Umversity School of Law).
54. 1995 Habeas Corpus Reform Hearings on H.R. 729, supra note 53 (statement
of Larry Yackle).
55. Under present law, such certificates are also necessary for an appeal, but
district court judges may issue them. Id.
56. Id.
57. Title II, "Federal Death Penalty Procedures Reform," is the heart of the Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act. H.R. 729, supra note 7, tit. II.
58. H.R. 729, supra note 7, § 2256. Tis provision only encourages the state to
1624
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If a state has established such a mechanism, it qualifies for the
application of several special provisions. First, the legislation
would allow federal district courts to grant a stay of execution
when considering a prisoner's initial petition." To receive a
stay for a successive petition, however, a petitioner would have
to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a
constitutional error, no reasonable jury would have convicted
him or sentenced hun to death."o Furthermore, only the same
judge who demed the defendant's original petition could analyze
any successive petitions, and he could consider them only if he
determined that the filings were not abuses of the writ.6' The
bill also reqires a prisoner to file any federal habeas corpus
petition within 180 days of the appointment of counsel to pur-
sue state postconviction proceedings.62 While the prisoner has
provide competent counsel during postconviction proceedings. The House rejected an
amendment that sought to encourage states to provide competent effective counsel
during the initial trial by a vote of 282 to 149. 141 CONG. REC., supra note 48, at
H1406-07. The amendment, offered by Representative Schumer, would have required
states to set up an organization to establish standards for the appointment of com-
petent counsel in capital cases and to ensure that attorneys in death cases were
appointed from the roster established by the organization. Id. If states did not im-
plement this system, they would have been ineligible for the habeas restrictions in
the bill. Id.
In response to the amendment, the proponent of the Effective Death Penalty
Act, Representative McCullom, stated:
[Tihe truth of the matter is that we do have a procedure for adequate
counsel and all kinds of protections for the accused that are built into
that system at the trial level.
[W]hat he does by his amendment today is to add a series of things that
people have to go through, a roster has to be formed, a State has to
pass a counsel authority in one of three or four forms and you have to
comply with all of these procedures and in the end the expense and the
problems and the difficulty of going through this in my judgment and
many others' who have looked at this will mean that most States will
choose not to do this. Therefore, we will not have an effective bill.
We will not shorten the time death row inmates have for carrying out
their sentences that we want to do.
Id. at 1407. This statement demonstrates that the proponent of the bill focused on
efficiency of executions and did not want states to have to undergo the trouble of
ensuring that qualified counsel represent indigent capital defendants.
59. See H.R. 729, supra note 7, § 2257(a).
60. Id. § 2257(c)(3).
61. Id. § 2257(d).
62. 1995 Habeas Corpus Reform Heanngs on H.R. 729, supra note 53, at 102
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state postconviction petitions pending, the 180-day limitation is
suspended.' 3
Finally, Title II limits the time that the federal courts have to
consider habeas petitions. Under section 2262, a federal district
court must make a decision on a prisoner's petition within sixty
days after hearing argument, and a federal appellate court must
make a decision within mnety days after receiving the briefs
from both sides.'
Reform of the Death Penalty System Should Be Focused on
Providing Better Representation to Death-Eligible Defendants at
Trial and Should Not Focus Excluswely on the Postconwictzon
Phase
The proposals that have emerged from the habeas corpus
reform debate so far and the approach that the House of Repre-
sentatives has adopted in the Effective Death Penalty Act can be
summed up generally as the "one-bite-at-the-apple rule."65 The
reform bill attempts to accord death row inmates one full oppor-
tunity for federal and state review of their claims while strictly
restricting successive petitions.66 These reforms are based on
the perception that delay is caused either by the death row in-
mates themselves or by the court system's failure to deal expedi-
tiously with habeas petitions.67 In reality, the massive delay
and unfairness that occur during postconviction proceedings
result from inadequate representation at the trial level.6
(statement of Larry Yackle).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Berger, supra note 2, at 1674 (quoting 135 CONG. REC. S13,473 (daily ed. Oct.
16, 1989) (statement of Sen. Biden)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1668-71.
68. See Habeas Corpus: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 432 (1993) [here-
mafter 1993 House Judiciary Habeas Hearings] (statement of George H. Kendall,
Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense Fund); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STUDY
OF REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL CASES IN VIRGINIA 28 (1988) ("If appointed counsel
for indigent defendants in capital cases were to be adequately paid and given those
resources necessary to provide the best representation possible, then the kinds of
problems and errors which come up through post-conviction appeals nght be sub-
stantially reduced."); see also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8 at 15-16 (arguing
1626
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The states' failure to provide competent counsel at the trial
level in death penalty cases, which are much more complex than
most types of litigation, results in a high level of constitutional
error caused by undercompensated and ill-prepared counsel.69
As a result, the federal courts must painstakingly examine each
habeas case to weed out these constitutional errors.70 Because
inadequate representation causes or at least contributes to the
problems of delay during postconviction proceedings, any reform
bill must address this problem to make reform proposals effec-
tive.7' Any attempt to reform the habeas system that fails to
address the issue of representation at the trial level would be
"like trying to stop massive internal bleeding with a butterfly
patch."7
2
Unfortunately, while the Effective Death Penalty Act man-
dates that states provide some means for ensuring that compe-
tent counsel represent indigent death-eligible defendants during
postconviction proceedings in order for the states to be eligible
that inadequate representation "greatly aggravates and protracts the death penalty
review process"); Bright supra note 3, at 1837 ("The process of sorting out who is
most deserving of society's ultimate pumshment does not work when the most fun-
damental component of the adversary system, competent representation by counsel,
is missing.").
69. 1995 Habeas Corpus Reform Hearings on H.R. 729, supra note 53 (statement
of Gerald H. Goldstein, President, National Ass'n of Criminal Lawyers). The high
level of error has caused the federal courts to order retrials m almost 40% of the
death penalty cases reviewed before 1976. Id.
70. The ABA Task Force on the Death Penalty noted in a 1989 report that:
Without any doubt, the inadequacy of representation at the trial level
greatly increases the risk of convictions that are flawed by fundamental
factual, legal, or constitutional error. Too often, due to inadequacies of
counsel, the jury never gets to hear evidence that could thoroughly alter
its view of a case. Equally often, trial and appellate lawyers typically do
not understand the post-conviction implications-state or federal-of their
acts or onssions. A great deal of time thus is consumed during state
and federal post-conviction review to determine whether these mediocre
performances by counsel pass the Strickland standard. It is simply
unrealistic to expect the system to operate better when its most funda-
mental component-informed, diligent, and effective advocacy-is missing
at the trial level, the "fountainhead of justice."
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 69 (footnotes omitted).
71. See 1993 House Judiciary Habeas Hearings, supra note 68, at 449 (statement
of George H. Kendall).
72. 1995 Habeas Corpus Reform Hearings on H.R. 729, supra note 53 (statement
of Gerald H. Goldstein).
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for the habeas tune limits, the bill does not encourage the states
to provide competent counsel at the trial level.7" The failure to
address the problem of ensuring adequate representation at the
trial level is destined to eviscerate any increase in the effective-
ness of representation during postconviction proceedings. The
initial trial is "virtually the whole ball game" and once errors
are made at that stage, counsel may not be able to cure them
during appellate or postconviction review 4
In addition to its failure to address representation at the trial
level, the bill does not go far enough in its efforts to ensure
adequate postconviction review Although the measure requires
states to adopt standards for appointing attorneys to
postconviction cases, it leaves to the states the task of develop-
ing applicable standards.75 Although the effectiveness of ap-
pointment standards is debatable, requiring attorneys to meet
some set of standards is a step toward improving the quality of
representation in capital cases.7" It is difficult to believe, how-
ever, that states that consistently have underfunded indigent de-
fense programs and have tolerated inadequate representation for
indigent defendants for decades will suddenly adopt strict stan-
dards to ensure the appointment of qualified counsel." The
failure of the House of Representatives to impose mandatory
standards is disappointing, particularly in light of the American
Bar Association's (ABA) compilation of model standards.78
In light of the bill's failure to require significant reforms of
state indigent defense systems, the provisions that provide for
speeding up the review process will merely exacerbate the prob-
lems that already exist. While states may carry out executions
faster, the system will not be able to exercise the careful, search-
73. See H.R. 729, supra note 7, § 2256.
74. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES 33 (1989) [hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES]; see 1995 Habeas
Corpus Reform Hearings on H.R. 729, supra note 53 (statement of Larry Yackle) ("If
counsel is not provided until the post-conviction stage, I am afraid that the real
damage to constitutional rights will already have been done and that ever more
time and effort will have to be spent to sort things out in federal court.").
75. See H.R. 729, supra note 7, § 2256.
76. See infra notes 254-68 and accompanying text.
77. See Berger, supra note 2, at 1690.
78. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 74.
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ing review of habeas petitions that must accompany any trial
system that produces a large number of constitutional errors
and violations due to inexperienced and incompetent counsel.79
In particular, the bill's requirement that indigent death row
inmates file their federal habeas petitions within six months
after the state courts deny their petition is too restrictive and
does not allow adequate time for the preparation of a federal
habeas corpus petition.0
The bill's other provisions regarding restrictions on filing
successive petitions, authorization to deny relief despite a failure
to exhaust state remedies, and filing deadlines for federal pns-
oner also will exacerbate the problems in the habeas system.8'
As a whole, the bill fails to address the critical issue of providing
competent counsel to death-eligible defendants at the trial level
and instead leaves to the states the need to adopt their own
systems for the appointment and compensation of counsel.82
Congress's failure to evaluate state indigent defense systems
specifically and to require them to use specific types of systems
to provide indigent capital defendants with counsel is perhaps
79. Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 944 (1989), demonstrates why the review process should not be subject to strin-
gent time limitations. Dewey Coleman spent more than thirteen years on death row
before his conviction was reversed despite the fact that there were "glaring deficien-
cies" in the case against him. Id. at 1292 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). In a world
with time limitations on habeas review, Coleman might have been executed before
these deficiencies could have been uncovered and addressed. Id. (Remhardt, J., con-
curring) (stating that "the case of Dewey Coleman illustrates the fact that curtailing
the federal habeas corpus procedures in death penalty cases would seriously under-
mine our system of justice and our commitment to constitutional values").
80. See 1995 Habeas Corpus Reform Heanngs on H.R. 729, supra note 53 (state-
ment of Larry Yackle) ("[1]n light of the complexity of capital cases and the time re-
quired to recruit lawyers to handle them, I should think that the one year period
contained in last year's bill is the shortest that can sensibly be established."); see
also Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionality of
the Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by
State Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 451, 487-96 (1991)
(discussing why a six-month limit does not provide an attorney with the time to
properly prepare a habeas petition).
81. For a detailed discussion of the problems that these reforms will cause, see
Berger, supra note 2, at 1704-14.
82. H.R. 729, supra note 7, § 2256; see also 141 CONG. REC., supra note 48, at
H1406-09 (containing debate about whether states should be compelled to establish a
system ensuring adequate representation at the trial level).
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due partly to concerns about notions of federalism.' In any
event, reformers should focus on identifying an effective and
efficient state indigent defense system that provides competent
representation to death-eligible defendants and then concentrate
on encouraging or forcing states with the death penalty to adopt
such a system. Thefirst step toward this goal is to identify the
types of indigent defense systems that states use today and to
analyze their strengths and weaknesses in order to design a
more effective system.
AN ANALYSIS OF TRIAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEMS
Since the Supreme Court's announcement in Gideon that the
Sixth Amendment requires states to provide indigent defendants
with competent counsel, the states have struggled to establish
systems that comply with this mandate." States have been re-
sponsible for designing, implementing, and funding these sys-
tems.' Unfortunately, while indigent defendants in all of the
states receive representation through some form of state defense
system, the representation, particularly in capital cases, often
does not comply with the requirements of the Sixth Amend-
83. See infra notes 276-321 and accompanying text; see also 1995 House Judiciary
Habeas Hearings on H.R. 729, supra note 53, at 495 (statements of Benjamin
Civiletti, Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Edward H. Levi, and Elliot L. Richardson on
behalf of the Emergency Committee To Save Habeas Corpus).
Consistent with notions of federalism, states must be free to provide a
lesser level of counsel [than the one required by a provision requiring
appointment of counsel from a roster of qualified attorneys] if they wish,
but the federal courts should not then be required to sort through the
various procedural doctrines which presume that the state court trial was
full and correct and should simply proceed directly to the merits of the
habeas claim.
Id. See generally Note, supra note 29, at 1938-39 & n.146 (discussing the role that
federalism plays in limiting federal actions that would mandate that states take
steps to improve the quality of defense provided in capital cases).
84. AMEmICAN BAR ASS'N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE
FUNDING 3 (1983) [hereinafter GIDEON UNDONE] (statement of Robert Raven, Chair-
man, ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants).
85. See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR: METHODS
AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR ADE-
QUATE FINANCING apps. a-g (1982) (describing state indigent defense systems, listing
state statutes establishing the systems, and detailing the source of funds used to
support each system).
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ment.86 In death penalty cases, this noncompliance is especially
disturbing due to the permanence of the punishment.'
These systems fail to fulfill their function primarily because
the states do not provide enough funding for indigent defense.8
Because states have little money to compensate private counsel
adequately or to establish public defender programs to specialize
in capital cases, few attorneys volunteer to represent capital
defendants, and public defenders cannot do so adequately89
Several commentators have recogmzed the funding problem and
have discussed it at length.0 Ultimately, until indigent defense
systems are funded properly, it will be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to ensure that all indigent capital defendants receive the
level of representation that the Sixth Amendment requires.9
Unfortunately, the funding horizon looks bleak. With the
recent passage of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill,92 most federal
funds will go to state and federal law enforcement agencies and
not to indigent defense.93 Within the states, prosecutors tradi-
tionally have received more than three times the amount that
defense services have received and, with the current "tough-on-
86. Bright, supra note 3, at 1841 ("Inadequate legal representation does not occur
in just a few capital cases. It is pervasive in those jurisdictions which account for
most of the death sentences.").
87. See McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2787 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); Marshall, supra note 3, at 1.
88. For a detailed discussion of the states' failure to provide adequate funding to
indigent defense systems and the effects of this underfunding, see generally GIDEON
UNDONE, supra note 84 (noting problems with states' indigent defense programs);
SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS*N, THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS
(1993) [hereinafter THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS] (summanzmg the fundamental
problems in indigent defense nationwide); Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J.
Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis Is Chronic, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1994, at 12
(documenting the crisis in indigent defense and suggesting system-wide remedies).
89. See Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 88, at 14-15.
90. See Bright, supra note 3; Albert L. Vreeland, II, Note, The Breath of the
Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in
Capital Litigation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 626, 636-50 (1991).
91. See THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS, supra note 88, at 2.
92. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796.
93. 1 THE SPANGENBERG REPORT (The Spangenberg Group, Newton, Mass.), Sept.
1994, at 1, 4. The Spangenberg Group, located in Newton, Massachusetts, specializes
in indigent defense issues. It conducts studies of indigent defense systems and pub-
lishes a newsletter entitled The Spangenberg Report.
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crime" political atmosphere, this appears unlikely to change.'
Some challenges to the underfunding of state systems have
been successful, but most have centered around the unreason-
ably low compensation provided to appointed attorneys or on the
unreasonably low statutory caps on attorney compensation.95 In
addition to the lack of funding, the form of an indigent defense
system itself often contributes to problems of attorney mexperi-
ence, lack of traimng, and overburdemng." These problems will
be solved only when states restructure their defense systems to
eliminate deficiencies in those systems or increase funding for
indigent defense.9 7 Any effort to reform these systems must be-
gin with an understanding of the major forms of indigent de-
fense systems and the problems associated with each type of
system.
State indigent defense systems vary considerably in their
orgamzation." In some states, each county chooses and mom-
tors its own system.9 9 In these states, different counties often
use several different types of systems.'00 Other states have es-
tablished a uniform statewide system and have created a state
orgamzation responsible for controlling it.' 0 ' Regardless of
94. BAR INFORMATION PROGRAM POST CONVICTION DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTA-
TION PROJECT, AMERICAN BAR ASS N, A COMPARISON OF PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
RESOURCES FOR CAPITAL LITIGATION 5 (1991).
95. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (holding
that failures in the state contract system created an inference that the system pro-
duced inadequate representation and ordering the system to comply with certain
standards); White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (Fla. 1989)
(declaring state maximum fee cap of $3500 unconstitutional when applied to inter-
fere with the right to effective assistance of counsel in a capital case)..
96. Thurgood Marshall commented on the need for attorneys handling capital
cases to be better trained, noting that "[tihe bar must focus on improving the quali-
ty of trial counsel in capital cases, and must find resources to establish training and
assistance for local attorneys appointed to handle capital cases." Marshall, supra
note 3, at 4.
97. Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 88, at 15-16.
98. See, e.g., LEFSTEIN, supra note 85, at apps. a-g (describing the indigent de-
fense systems of 50 states).
99. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-12-2 to -4 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-37 (1990
& Supp. 1995).
100. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-12-2 to -4; GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-37.
101. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-87-202, -206 (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 21-1-101, -103 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-289, -296 (West 1985
& Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 4601-4602 (1991). Most statewide mdi-
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whether a state uses a statewide system or a county-by-county
system, the controlling organization must decide how it will
structure that system to best provide for the area's needs. Al-
though these systems differ among the states, almost all of them
can be classified as one of three systems: assigned counsel or "ad
hoc" systems, contract systems, and public defender systems.0 2
Some jurisdictions use a mixture of the different types of sys-
tems, with one system acting as the primary system and another
acting as a secondary system for use in cases in which conflicts
arise or the prinary system is overburdened." 3
Ad Hoc or Assigned Counsel Systems
Three of the thirty-seven states with the death penalty use an
assigned counsel system as their sole primary system.' 4 An-
other twelve states use this system in at least some part of their
primary system.0 5 Nearly all of the states use this type of sys-
tem as a secondary system to back up their primary system.0 6
Under this system, judges appoint members of the private bar
to represent indigent capital defendants. 07 In some systems,
the judge appoints counsel based on personal knowledge of avail-
able attorneys, but, in others, attorneys are appointed from a
list of attorneys willing to represent capital defendants.' 8 As-
signed counsel systems can be further subdivided according to
gent defense systems have created a public defender commssion that promulgates
rules and oversees the operation of smaller district public defender offices. Approxi-
mately 11 states employ this type of system, including Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Ohio, and Wyoming. The Spangenberg Group, A Study of Capital Representation in
Texas 122 (1993) [hereinafter Texas Study] (unpublished study on file with Author).
102. See David P Cullen, Indigent Defense Comparison of Ad Hoc and Contract De-
fense in Five Semi-Rural Jurisdictions, 17 OKL& CITY U. L. REV. 311, 320-23 (1992).
103. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 85, at 7; Texas Study, supra note 101, at 120-21.
104. Texas Study, supra note 101, at 121-22. These states include Alabama, Missis-
sippi, and Texas. Id.
105. Id. These states are Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Montana, Nebraska, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. Id.
106. Id.
107. LEFSTEIN, supra note 85, at 8; Cullen, supra note 102, at 320.
108. Pauline Houlden & Steven Balkin, Quality and Cost Comparisons of Private
Bar Indigent Defense Systems: Contract vs. Ordered Assigned Counsel, 76 J. CRIM. L.
& Cml iNOLOGY 176, 177-78 (1985).
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whether the appointing judge uses a list of qualified counsel,
whether the list has separate levels of qualifications for different
crimes, and whether a judge or county official is responsible for
monitoring the performance of the system and the payment of
attorneys.
10 9
The major problem with this type of system is that few attor-
neys are willing to accept capital cases because of the low pay
and high time commitment required.10 As a result, judges of-
ten appoint inexperienced counsel who are incompetent to try
complex capital cases."' In some cases, capital defendants
have been represented at trial by appointed counsel who were
unable to name more than two criminal-law decisions,"' who
referred to their clients using racial slurs,"' or who appeared
to be drunk during most of the trial."' These are just a few of
the most egregious examples of attorney incompetence." 5
109. Id. at 178.
110. See, e.g., Bright, supra note 3, at 1844 (noting that, because of standard legal
compensation, "few accomplished lawyers can be enticed to defend capital cases").
111. See Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 746 (11th Cir.) (involving an attorney ap-
pointed to capital case six months after passing bar exam), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1026 (1985); Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532, 1555 (11th Cir. 1983) (describ-
ing how the judge had to take defense counsel into chambers and explain what the
penalty phase was because trial counsel had never tried a capital case before), va-
cated and remanded, 468 U.S. 1206 (1984).
112. Stephen Bright tells the story of a capital defendant represented by an attor-
ney at trial who was asked by the judge to name cnminal-law decisions with
which he was familiar. Bright, supra note 3, at 1839 (citing Transcript of Hearing
of April 25-27, 1988, at 231, State v. Birt (Super. Ct. Jefferson County, Ga. 1988)
(No. 2360)). The attorney named Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Bright, supra note 3, at
1839. Evidently, the attorney was not aware that Dred Scott was not a criminal
case. Id. n.32.
113. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13 (11th Cir. 1982) (de-
fense counsel called the defendant "a little old nigger boy" during his closing argu-
ment), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983).
114. In People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419 (Cal. 1989) (en banc), the defendant filed
a habeas corpus petition alleging, among other things, that counsel was ineffective
at trial because he was intoxicated, id. at 440-41. Despite evidence given by the
bailiff that counsel smelled of alcohol, evidence that counsel consumed large amounts
of alcohol each day at the trial, and further evidence that counsel was arrested
while driving to the courthouse for driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.27%,
the court ruled that counsel's condition did not prejudice the defendant. Id.
115. Thurgood Marshall remarked that "[t]he federal reports are filled with stories
of counsel who presented no evidence in mitigation of their client's sentences because
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Texas is the only state that uses an assigned counsel system
as its primary defense system."6 The Texas system has been
described as being "substantially inadequate" due to its many
problems." 7 These problems typify the problems discussed
above, which affect all assigned counsel systems to one degree or
another.
In Texas, qualified attorneys are reluctant to volunteer for
capital cases because of the complexity of the matters, the enor-
mous time demands, the unavailability of support services, and
the inadequate compensation paid by the state."' A. study of
capital case representation in Texas concluded that:
[Tihe situation in Texas can only be described as desperate.
The volume of cases is overwhelming but the number of
available attorneys remains limited. In the long run, the
problem in Texas will not be solved by a voluntary pro-
gram. Many lawyers are reluctant to take those cases which
invariably require an enormous personal sacrifice without
compensation. Other lawyers refuse to take additional cases
after having experienced a whole range of problems with
their most recent case or cases. Moreover, most lawyers are
reluctant to participate because of the substantial complexity
of the law "9
In many assigned counsel systems, including the Texas sys-
tem, attorneys must meet no minmum qualification standards
before they are allowed to try capital cases.' Due to the lack
of such standards, a judge can appoint a lawyer who has no
they did not know what to offer or how to offer it, or had not read the state's sen-
tencing statute." Marshall, supra note 3, at 2 (citations omitted). For a detailed
discussion of the atrocious representation that many capital defendants receive, see
Bright, supra note 3.
116. Texas Study, supra note 101, at 154.
117. Id. at 153.
118. Id. at 152; see also Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt
Not Be Compelled To Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363,
370 (1993) (noting that often it is the trial judge who authorizes payment to the de-
fense counsel rather than the defendant).
119. Texas Study, supra note 101, at ii.
120. See Stephen B. Bright et al., Keeping Gideon from Being Blown Away, CRIM.
JUST., Winter 1990, at 10, 12-13; Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error
in the Nation's Death Belt, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30, 31.
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capital trial experience based on "subjective criteria" such as
frendship or political support.''
Contract Systems
None of the states with the death penalty use a contract sys-
tem as their sole means of providing representation to indigent
defendants."2 Four states, however, use this system in con-
junction with another system as part of their primary sys-
tem." Under these systems, a judge, county official, officer of
the court, or a public defender contracts with a local bar associa-
tion, a law school clinic, a public or private defender orgamza-
tion, a private law firm, or individual attorneys to provide legal
representation for indigent defendants in a particular jurisdic-
tion." In many jurisdictions, these systems are used when the
public defender's office has a conflict." These systems can be
further subdivided by analyzing whether the contract for legal
services is awarded on the basis of competitive or noncompeti-
tive bidding.'
The main problem with contract systems is that the quality of
representation suffers because of attempts to provide more cost-
effective representation, 7 especially in systems in which the
contract bidding is competitive and the contract is awarded to
the lowest bidder. 2 8 The contracting agency is awarded the
contract and paid its fee up front."9 That agency is then re-
sponsible for budgeting its time and money to deal with the
121. Texas Study, supra note 101, at 55.
122. See tc. at 121-22.
123. Idaho, Kentucky, Oregon, and Washington all use contract systems as part of
their primary systems. Id.
124. Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of
the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
625, 679-80 (1986); Robert Spangenberg et al., Contract Defense Systems Under At-
tack: Balancing Cost and Quality, NLADA BRIEFCASE, Fall 1992, at 5, 5-8.
125. Spangenberg et al., supra note 124, at 9-14.
126. Id. at 7.
127. "Contract bidding short-sightedly sacrifices the legal interests of the indigent
on an alter [sIC] of short-term dollar savings and is, therefore, unacceptable." Id.
at 8.
128. Klein, supra note 124, at 680.
129. Id. at 680-81.
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defense of all indigent defendants m crimnal cases arising dur-
ing the particular contract period.30
Contract system attorneys, therefore, have a strong finan-
cial incentive to dispose of their cases quickly because trials
will not increase payment but will decrease profits.' Re-
search has borne out this theory and has demonstrated that
contract attorneys dispose of their cases more rapidly than
private attorneys.
3 2
Some of the other problems associated with contract programs
include: lack of fiscal or quality standards in the review of pro-
posed contracts, improper and arbitrarily fixed ceilings on per
case or per year costs, improper conflicts provisions creating a
disincentive to withdraw in cases in which a conflict actually
exists, private practice conflicts between the obligation to pro-
vide effective assistance of counsel to indigent clients and to
money-making clients of the firm, and a lack of monitoring and
evaluating mechamsms.' Furthermore, although ABA stan-
dards require contract systems to contain provisions ensuring
that capital cases are handled by experienced attorneys, many
programs do not include such provisions in their contracts."
Public Defender Programs
The majority of states with the death penalty employ a public
defender system as their primary system for providing counsel
to indigent capital defendants."5 Some states have established
130. See Spangenberg et al., supra note 124, at 17.
131. Klein, supra note 124, at 680.
132. See Houlden & Balkin, supra note 108, at 199 ("In this study, the differenc-
es that did appear concerned speed of disposition and number of attorney appear-
ances m court. Contract counsel made fewer appearances and processed cases more
quickly.").
133. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A STUDY OF THE INDIGENT DEFENDER SYSTEM IN
LOUISIANA 38-40 (1992) [heremafter LOUISIANA STUDY]. One Arizona court evaluated
the performance of contract systems while considering an ineffective assistance of
counsel clai and found that the system had so many problems associated with it
that it was very difficult for any capital defendant to receive an adequate defense.
State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (stating that "the system
for obtaining indigent defense counsel in Mohave County militates against adequate
assistance of counsel for indigent defendants").
134. LOUISIANA STUDY, supra note 133, at 14.
135. National Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n, Statewide Defender Programs: The Lay
16371996]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1617
a statewide public defender system in which a state public de-
fender commission regulates and supervises the public defender
offices in the different counties."' 8 Others continue to allow
counties to choose their systems, and some counties choose pub-
lic defender systems. These systems may be funded by the state,
the mumcipality, or both.17 In these systems, full-time, sala-
ned public defenders are appointed to represent indigent defen-
dants. Ideally, these systems are preferable to private, assigned
counsel systems because the attorneys are trained for indigent
defense, and they can focus their attention on their indigent cli-
ents without worrying about making a profit.1
8
Underfunding and case overloading plague public defender
systems.3 9 In 1990, the Spangenberg Group conducted a study
of the Fulton County, Georgia, indigent defense system.'40 At
that time, Fulton County primarily used a public defender sys-
tem to provide indigent representation.'' The report concluded
that there was insufficient staff, astronomical caseloads, no
traimng, little supervision, severe support service deficiencies,
and low morale.' The heavy caseloads caused some attorneys
to "cut corners" in their investigations and legal research.'
of the Land app. B (1992) (unpublished document on file with Author); Texas Study,
supra note 101, at 121-22.
136. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-87-202, 206(f) (Miclue Supp. 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 21-1-101, -103 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-289, -296 (West
1985 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 4601-4602 (1991).
137. See, e.g., The Spangenberg Group, Overview of the Fulton County, Georgia
Indigent Defense System 5-6 (1990) [hereinafter Fulton County Study] (unpublished
study on file with Author) (describing the sources of funds for the Fulton County
public defender system).
138. Klein, supra note 118, at 390.
139. See THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS, supra note 88, at 7-8.
140. Fulton County Study, supra note 137.
141. Between 70 and 80% of all defendants were assigned to a county public de-
fender. Id. at 24.
142. Id. at 42-45.
Because of the lack of training, experience and supervision, some trial
public defenders have been faced with their first jury trial in a homicide
or other extremely serious felony case. Some trial attorneys turn for help
to the deputy clhef public defender, the supervisor of appeals or another
experienced attorney in the office. However, if they do not seek out the
assistance, they will almost assuredly be on their own.
Id. at 28.
143. Id. at 26.
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Another problem was the lack of coordination between the coun-
ty public defender's office and other public defenders' offices.'
Although these deficiencies are not present in every public
defender system, they are indicative of the extreme problems
that can plague such a system. Most public defender systems
have insufficient resources and suffer at least some degree of
work overload.'45
ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS FOR PROVIDING ADEQUATE
REPRESENTATION TO CAPITAL DEFENDANTS
Death penalty proponents and opponents both agree that the
traditional forms of trial representation are not working to pro-
vide adequate representation to indigent capital defendants. 4 '
Capital cases, from an advocate's point of view, are some of the
most difficult and complex cases in the legal system.'47 They
involve a unique separate sentencing phase, a complex body of
law that is specific to death cases, and complicated and convolut-
ed doctrines that limit appellate review for errors committed at
trial.'48 In the traditional trial systems discussed above, a pri-
vate attorney or public defender without capital case experience
commonly will represent indigent capital defendants.49 The
greatest flaw of the traditional systems is their failure to provide
adequate training to attorneys who try death cases or to ensure
that private attorneys have enough training or experience to
Some attorneys told us that they seldom conduct legal research and fail
to file motions, again, even m situations where the result may be favor-
able to the defendant. One public defender told us, "I used to look hard
for the one issue that I could use to win the case. I now look for the
one issue that I can find to dispose of the case."
Id.
144. Id. at 37-38.
145. Id. at 45.
146. Berger, supra note 2, at 1673; see also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8,
at 70-71 (describing unanimity among representatives of states, victim's rights
groups, and defense representatives that adequate counsel must be provided at the
trial level).
147. One commentator has noted that capital trials are "the most technically diffi-
cult form of litigation known to the American legal system." Vreeland, supra note
90, at 645.
148. See Coyle et al., supra note 120, at 31.
149. See supra notes 92-139 and accompanying text.
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handle those cases properly '
Some states have attempted to reform these systems to ensure
that trial counsel are trained in the complexities of capital de-
fense or at least have a minmum level of experience in trying
capital cases. 5' These states have begun adopting minimum
standards that attorneys must satisfy before they can be ap-
pointed to represent an indigent capital defendant at trial."'
Others have developed specialized capital trial units consisting
of attorneys who are specially trained in capital defense and
who focus exclusively on providing representation to indigent
capital defendants at the trial level.' 3 Both of these new provi-
sions are designed to provide better representation to indigent
capital defendants at the trial level, but each has strengths and
weaknesses when used alone.'" Ultimately, the best system is
a combination of the two-a system in which primary represen-
tation is by a capital trial unit, and secondary representation is
by private attorneys who meet a set of minimum guidelines for
capital representation.' 5
State Capital Trial Units56
A number of states with the death penalty have set up special
units within their defense systems to deal specifically with indi-
gent capital defendants. 5' These special units are generally
composed of attorneys who are experienced capital counsel fa-
miliar with the complex law and procedure involved in trying
capital cases.' Ideally, all indigent capital defendants in a
state would be represented at trial by members of the capital
trial unit.5 9 The responsibilities and structure of these units
150. See Coyle et al., supra note 120, at 30.
151. 1 THE SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 93, at 9-12.
152. See, e.g., IND. R. CRIM. P 24; OHIO C.P SUP. R. 65.
153. 1 THE SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 93, at 9-12.
154. See znfra notes 150-64, 254-68 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 268-74 and accompanying text.
156. States have different names for these types of units, but, throughout this arti-
cle, the term "capital trial units" is used generically to denote any state unit estab-
lished to defend indigent capital defendants.
157. States with some form of these units include Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia,
and Oklahoma. 1 THE SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 93, at 9-12.
158. See infra notes 164-220 and accompanying text.
159. Some capital trial units, such as the Missouri Capital Litigation Unit, defend
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vary somewhat from state to state, but most of the units exist as
part of a statewide public defender office.'
For several reasons, the capital trial unit system is much
more effective than any of the traditional systems in providing
an adequate defense to an indigent capital defendant. First, the
complexity of death penalty defense work makes it analogous to
a medical specialty '.' To ensure that indigent defendants re-
ceive a competent defense, the system must provide them with
attorneys who have specialized expertise in this techmcal and
complicated area.6 2 Capital trial unit attorneys are such spe-
every indigent capital defendant in the state. Telephone Interview with Kevin
Curran, Division Director, Missouri Capital Litigation Unit (Feb. 21, 1995) [hereinaf-
ter Curran Interview]. Other units, such as the Arkansas Capital Conflicts and Ap-
peals Office, only represent capital indigent defendants when there are no qualified
public defenders. Telephone Interview with Didi Sallings, Director, Arkansas Capital
Conflicts and Appeals Office (Feb. 20, 1995) [hereinafter Sallings Interview]. For a
discussion of these two systems, see znfra notes 187-214 and accompanying text.
One interesting twist on the idea of capital trial unit representation is the
possibility that these units could become involved in death penalty trials only to
represent the defendant during the penalty phase, which is the most complicated
and unique part of the trial for nonspecialists. Unfortunately, while this would allow
the unit to be involved in more cases and possibly would reduce the cost of the
unit, the representation would suffer because, to be effective, any theme or defense
that would be offered during the penalty phase must be presented to the jury dur-
ing the trial. Telephone Interview with Kelly Gleason, Assistant Public Advocate,
Kentucky Capital Trial Unit (Feb. 22, 1995) [hereinafter Gleason Interview]. For
example, if, during the penalty phase, the capital trial unit attorney relies on the
argument that the defendant is mentally retarded, the failure of co-counsel to bring
this to light during the trial may make the argument ineffective. Id.
160. Curran Interview, supra note 159; Gleason Interview, supra note 159; Sallings
Interview, supra note 159.
161. Two capital trial unit attorneys analogized their practice to that of "medical
specialists." Gleason Interview, supra note 159; Sallings Interview, supra note 159.
162. An experienced former death penalty litigator noted that capital cases cannot
be adequately handled by nonspecialists, stating that "[it's not that the lawyer gets
into a trial and offers less skill than he is capable of giving. But it would be just
like appointing me to play for the Chicago Bulls-it's beyond my capability." Coyle
et al., supra note 120, at 31 (quoting Atlanta attorney Millard Farmer Jr.). Another
attorney has remarked that "I got on the [capital appointment] list my second year
out of school because I won some tough cases and some respect Well my cli-
ent got executed. I specialized in criminal defense, but I'll tell you what: this is not
criminal defense." Id. (quoting Mississippi attorney James Bell).
One should also note that the offices of many state attorneys general have
several attorneys who specialize in prosecuting capital cases. Gleason Interview,
supra note 159- Without corresponding capital defense specialists, the playing field is
uneven.
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cialists ls3 Second, the system is more cost-effective than pres-
ent systems because, by investing in capital trial units, states
can take a step toward reducing the number of constitutional
errors at trial. Fewer constitutional errors at trial in turn result
in fewer expensive retrials. The system thus saves money "
Third, these systems reduce the number of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims granted during habeas review because trials
are conducted by defense counsel who are experienced and com-
petent enough to avoid making glaring errors. s6 Reducing
these claims not only restores public faith in the justice system
but may also solve the problem of delay during habeas re-
view-a delay that Congress has sought to correct by setting
time limits on the process.' Fourth, the existence of capital
trial units may discourage prosecutors from seeking the death
penalty in borderline cases, thus further reducing the number of
capital cases in the habeas corpus process.'67
Although this system appears attractive, there are two rea-
sons why states may be reluctant to adopt it. First, most of the
states that have capital trial units use them as part of a state-
wide public defender system.' Many states, however, still use
a county-by-county system with public defender systems and as-
signed counsel or contract systems existing side-by-side in the
same state."9 At present, those states may not have a state-
163. Gleason Interview, supra note 159; Sallings Interview, supra note 159.
164. See Coyle et al., supra note 120, at 30.
165. Sallings Interview, supra note 159.
166. See supra notes 40-78 and accompanying text. In its most recent habeas re-
form bill, Congress failed even to address the issue of representation at the trial
level, focusing instead on the postconviction level. H.R. 729, supra note 7, § 2256.
167. Since [the creation of the Oklahoma capital trial unit], the number of
capital convictions has dropped dramatically Oklahoma prosecutors
now seek the death penalty less frequently they know they'll face
aggressive defense lawyers and no prosecutor wants to lose a capital
case. So borderline death-row convictions are less likely to happen, which
means those cases won't have to go through the tortuous appeals process,
gobbling up money and court time.
Naftali Bendavid, Habeas Reform's Defeat Reveals Diviswe Debate, RECORDER, May
16, 1994, at 1.
168. Curran Interview, supra note 159; Gleason Interview, supra note 159; Sallings
Interview, supra note 159.
169. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-12-2 to -4 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-37
(Michie 1990 & Supp. 1995).
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wide public defender office in which they can establish the unit.
This problem, however, probably could be solved if the state
were willing to directly fund a capital trial unit, bypassing the
whole notion of a statewide public defender system. Second,
some states also may be unwilling to adopt this system because
they deem it an extreme response if they have only a few death
cases every year. If the unit were part of an existing public de-
fender system, however, members of the unit could work exclu-
sively on the few death cases that arose. If no death cases arose,
they could become active in the regular work of the public de-
fender offices.
Although some states might be reluctant to establish such a
unit, several states that have established this type of system are
finding it to be more -effective at providing competent represen-
tation to capital defendants than were their previous sys-
tems." ° Kentucky, Arkansas, Missouri, and New York have set
up different forms of capital trial units, and these units are
roughly illustrative of some of the major forms that this concept
has taken to date.
Kentucky
Kentucky uses a "hometown representation" capital trial unit
system. The state has a statewide public defender system to
provide indigent defense services, which is supervised and con-
trolled by the Department of Public Advocacy ' Within the
Department of Public Advocacy, a capital trial unit was created
in 1990."72 The unit currently has two attorneys and handles
about six to ten death cases at any one time. The state usually
has about seventy death cases a year.'7 3
Unlike other systems, in which all indigent capital defendants
are represented by an attorney in the capital trial unit, the
Kentucky unit only represents capital defendants when no pub-
170. Curran Interview, supra note 159; Gleason Interview, supra note 159; Sallings
Interview, supra note 159.
171. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.010 (Baldwin 1992).
172. Gleason Interview, supra note 159.
173. Id.
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lic defender is able to handle the case.' 4 The result is that the
capital trial unit only represents capital defendants in rural
counties that have no public defender office. 7 ' If the unit has
more than ten to twelve cases at any one time, it will contract
with private attorneys to represent other defendants.' 6
Although local, "hometown" public defenders represent most of
the capital defendants, they must satisfy no standards before
being permitted to take the case. ' The capital unit, however,
monitors the performance of all attorneys in death penalty cases
and has the power to remove public defenders from cases if they
are not competent.'78 In addition, if the unit is forced to con-
tract with private attorneys, it requires the attorneys to meet
the ABA Guidelines for the appointment and performance of
counsel in death penalty cases' 9 and makes compliance a term
in the contract. 80
The unit has significantly reduced the number of death sen-
tences handed down.'8' Since its establishment, the capital tn-
al unit has never had a death sentence imposed on a client
whom it represented.'8' The unit has had problems, however,
with the quality of representation provided by some public de-
fenders and by contract and private attorneys.1
83
Overall, this type of "hometown representation" unit system
appears to do an excellent job of providing direct representation
to indigent capital defendants.M Although there is no guaran-
tee that public defenders, contract attorneys, or private attor-
neys have the training, competence, or expertise necessary to
provide adequate representation, the unit nevertheless appears
to be able to control this problem by carefully monitoring
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See infra notes 222-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
guidelines.
180. Gleason Interview, supra note 159.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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attorneys' performance and by removing incompetent coun-
sel." Nevertheless, a system of standards requiring private
attorneys to have specific knowledge of death penalty law and
procedure might elimnate situations in which the unit has to
remove an attorney during the trial process.'86
Arkansas
Arkansas employs a "qualified hometown representation" type
of capital trial unit system. The state has a statewide public
defender system to provide indigent defense services."' The
Capital Conflicts and Appellate office was created by statute in
1993 as part of the public defender commission." In February
1995, the office had five attorneys in the unit and was handling
twenty-seven death penalty cases.'89
When an indigent defendant is charged with a capital crime
in Arkansas, he is defended by a public defender who satisfies
the Arkansas minimum qualification standards.9 ' These stan-
dards are not as strict as the ABA standards, but they require
significant felony trial experience and some capital case experi-
ence.' If there are no qualified public defenders in a particu-
lar jurisdiction, the unit attorneys will try the case.'92 If no
qualified public defenders are available and the unit has too
many cases, a private attorney who meets the qualification stan-
dards will be appointed.'93
Arkansas's implementation of this system has resulted in
"cleaner and better argued" trials." Because very few public
defenders satisfy the standards, the unit tries most of the capi-
tal cases in the state.'95 The only problem that this unit has
185. Id.
186. See infra notes 260-70 and accompanying text.
187. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-202 to -203 (Michie Supp. 1993).
188. Id. § 16-87-205.
189. Sallings Interview, supra note 159.
190. Id.
191. Id. For a detailed discussion of state standards for the appointment of counsel
in death penalty cases, see infra notes 220-70 and accompanying text.
192. Sallings Interview, supra note 159.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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experienced is that the unit attorneys encounter a certain degree
of,hostility when they defend an indigent capital defendant in a
town where the prosecutor is well-acquainted with the judge. 196
In general, this system combines the use of standards and a
capital trial unit to provide competent representation. 197 Allow-
ing qualified local public defenders to represent indigent capital
defendants makes full use of a local defender's knowledge of
local customs and "home rules" to the benefit of the defen-
dant."'98 Under this system, however, the standards employed
are very important.' 99 If the unit carefully monitors the ap-
pointment of public defenders to ensure that they meet the stan-
dards and are qualified, the system probably will be very effec-
tive. 00 If, however, another state adopted this system and im-
plemented standards so lement that everyone was qualified to
try capital cases, the advantages of having a capital trial unit
would disappear because almost all attorneys would be "quali-
fied" and the umt would never try any cases. If standards ac-
company such a capital trial unit, they must be strict enough to
ensure that qualified counsel are as capable as the attorneys in
the capital umt and that the unit can monitor the qualification
process to ensure compliance with the standards.2 '
Missouri
Missouri uses a "pure capital unit" type of capital trial unit
system. The state has a statutory statewide public defender
commission. 2  The Missouri Capital Litigation Unit was creat-
ed informally within the public defender commission in
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. See td.
199. Some commentators have criticized standards based solely on the number of
years of trial practice as ineffective m ensuring that counsel have enough actual
knowledge of death penalty law and procedure to provide competent representation.
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 217-19 (Minority Report of Stephen B.
Bright); infra notes 254-59 and accompanying text.
200. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 217-19 (Minority Report of Stephen
B. Bright).
201. Id.
202. MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 600.015, .017, .019 (Vernon 1995).
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1989.03 The unit has three offices and seventeen attorneys and
currently is handling sixty-five to seventy cases.2
4
The capital litigation unit defends all indigent capital defen-
dants at the trial level, except in rare instances when a conflict
emerges."' In conflict cases, the unit appoints a private attor-
ney from a list of attorneys whom members of the unit know to
be qualified.0 ' The state presently has no system of standards
for the appointment of counsel in death penalty cases but is
considering adopting standards to cover the rare instances when
a private attorney is appointed.
The unit has performed effectively since its creation in 1989.
The year before the unit was established, thirteen capital defen-
dants were sentenced to death.08 Since the unit started, no
more than five capital defendants have been sentenced to death
in any one year, and ninety percent of all capital cases are re-
solved without a death sentence.0 9
Although the unit has been very effective, ineffective assis-
tance claims are still granted occasionally, but obvious errors
are no longer a problem.210 The unit has no formal training
program but presently uses an apprentice system coupled with
intensive training seminars to train its staff attorneys.21'
Overall, this system provides excellent representation to indi-
gent capital defendants. The system is a "pure" capital trial unit
system in the sense that a specialist in capital cases represents
every indigent capital defendant. Only in very rare conflict cases
are private attorneys used for capital cases.2' To the extent
that this system provides every indigent capital defendant with
representation by a unit attorney, it is by far the best of the
various capital trial unit systems. Because the unit cannot rep-
203. Curran Interview, supra note 159.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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resent defendants in all of the cases that arise every year,' 13
however, Missouri should create standards detailing the qualifi-
cations that private counsel must meet m order to be appointed
in an "overflow" case.214
New York
The State of New York reinstated the death penalty in 1995
after intense debate about the wisdom of the penalty and proce-
dures needed to ensure its fair application.215 Although oppo-
nents of the death penalty could not block passage of the law,
they succeeded in forcing the legislature to include provisions
relating to the appointment of counsel for indigent death-eligible
defendants.216 Specifically, the law provides for a Capital De-
fender Office to be responsible for overseeing the defense of
indigent capital defendants.1 7
Three board members chosen by the chief judge of the Court
of Appeals, the president of the senate, and the speaker of the
assembly govern the Capital Defender Office.2"8 The board has
the authority to appoint a Capital Defender, and the Capital
Defender may consult with the board and hire staff attorneys,
investigators, and other support staff.21 The Capital Defender
Office is responsible for: selecting attorneys to represent indi-
gent capital defendants at the trial level or defending the indi-
gent defendants themselves; providing advice, investigative
services, and experts to attorneys representing capital defen-
dants; devising a set of mimmum standards for use in appoint-
ing non-unit attorneys to represent indigent capital defendants;
training attorneys; and contracting with legal organizations to
213. Id.
214. See infra notes 260-70 and accompanying text for proposed standards.
215. See generally James Dao, New York Leaders Offer Limited Bill on Death Pen-
alty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1995, at Al (discussing compromises agreed to by oppo-
nents and proponents of the death penalty); Kevm Sack, New York's Fight on Death
Penalty Shifts to Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at Al (discussing the debate over
the death penalty).
216. Dao, supra note 215, at Al.
217. N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 35-b(3), -b(8) (Consol. Midyear Supp. 1995).
218. Id. § 35-b(3).
219. Id. § 35-b(4)(a).
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provide representation to indigent capital defendants in a partic-
ular jurisdiction.220
According to the law, an indigent faced with a capital crime is
entitled to two attorneys.22' The Capital Defender Office must
submit a list of four possible defense teams to the trial judge or
may elect to represent the defendant itself.' In jurisdictions
in winch the Capital Defender Office has contracted with a legal
organization to undertake the defense of indigent capital defen-
dants, the organization is charged with the representation.223 If
the Capital Defender Office does not submit the names of quali-
fied attorneys and does not undertake representation, the trial
judge may appoint attorneys whose names appear on a list of
qualified attorneys who have satisfied the standards set by the
Capital Defender Office.2"
Although an examination of the text of the law is useful to
determine the theoretical design of the defense system, how the
Capital Defender Office will operate in practice is unclear be-
cause of the recency of the law's passage. For example, because
the law does not requre the Capital Defender Office to repre-
sent all indigent capital defendants,"' it is unclear if the office
will defend most capital defendants or if it will appoint private
attorneys to defend the majority of capital defendants.2 6
This system combines the use of qualification standards and a
capital trial unit."7 It resembles Arkansas's "qualified home-
town representation" system because it provides for either the
appointment of attorneys who meet the miimum standards or
representation by members of the Capital Defender Office. 8
The effectiveness of tins system will depend, to a great extent,
on the quality of the standards set by the Defender Office. If
220. Id. § 35-b(4)(b).
221. Id. § 35-b(2).
222. See rd.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. In all likelihood, this depends upon the size of the unit and the number of
death penalty trials each year. The law likely was drafted with this intentional
flexibility because neither of these numbers was known at the time of drafting.
227. Id. §§ 35-b(2) to -b(5).
228. See supra notes 187-201 and accompanying text.
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most indigent capital defendants are represented by appointed
attorneys, and those attorneys are required to meet minimal
standards based only on years of experience, the system may not
be very effective, despite the existence of a Capital Defender Of-
fice.229 If, however, the Capital Defender Office sets high stan-
dards based on ability and experience and represents all indi-
gent defendants unless there is a conflict, the system may work
extremely well. Ultimately, the effectiveness of this system will
depend on how it is applied.
Qualification Standards for Attorneys Representing Capital
Defendants
Instead of, or in conjunction with, establishing a capital trial
unit to provide better representation to indigent capital defen-
dants, some states have created mimmum qualification stan-
dards that attorneys must meet in order to represent indigent
capital defendants.2 0 These standards are designed to ensure
that indigent capital defendants are represented by competent
counsel with capital case experience."' The ABA has recog-
mzed the need for such standards and has formally encouraged
the states to adopt standards.2 In 1989, the ABA drafted a
set of model guidelines for the appointment and performance of
counsel in death penalty cases."3 Additionally, the most recent
habeas corpus reform bill, the Effective Death Penalty Act,'
includes a section requiring states to use a set of mimmum stan-
229. For a discussion of the problems associated with a standards-based system,
see infra notes 254-59 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the law also allows the
Capital Defender Office to make contracts for the defense of indigent capital defen-
dants in a particular junsdiction despite the problems associated with contract de-
fense systems. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b(4)(vi).
230. See, e.g., IND. R. CRIM. P 24; OHIo C.P SUP. R. 65; Virginia State Bar, Pub-
lic Defender Commission Adopts Standards for the Appointment of Counsel in Capital
Cases, VA. LAW. REG., Apr. 1992, at 8, 8 [hereinafter Public Defender Commission
Adopts Standards].
231. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 74, at 31-39. The Supreme Court of Olo
adopted the first set of such standards m 1987. 1 THE SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra
note 93, at 11.
232. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 74; see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at
61-71.
233. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 74.
234. See supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
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dards for the appointment of postconviction counsel in order to
qualify for the habeas time limits."
All states should adopt some form of standards for several
reasons. First, although states with the death penalty use differ-
ent indigent defense systems, all of those systems suffer from
the same problem-inexperienced and unqualified attorneys
regularly trying capital cases to the detriment of the individual
defendant and the system as a whole." s By adopting stan-
dards, states can improve the quality of representation without
making drastic alterations in their existing systems. " 7 Second,
the adoption of standards is a relatively inexpensive way for the
states to begin to reform their systems because no extensive
cash outlay is necessary "4 Third, standards can be used in
systems with capital trial units in cases in which a unit attorney
does not represent an indigent capital defendant due to case
overload or conflict. 9
Even if states agree that the adoption of mimmum standards
is a good idea, a great deal of disagreement remains over what
the standards should look like. 9 The ABA standards focus on
the attorney's experience in trying serious criminal cases, specif-
ically focusing on the number of years that she has practiced
and the number of capital cases in which she has been in-
volved." 1 In contrast, some commentators have argued that
qualification standards should focus on an attorney's knowledge
of death penalty jurisprudence and trial advocacy skills, in addi-
tion to experience." Regardless of this view, however, almost
235. See supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
236. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 63-71 (describing the prob-
lems caused by attorney inexperience and incompetence).
237. Most states that use standards have some type of organization that oversees
compliance with the standards or "certifies" attorneys as qualified. See, e.g., OHIO
C.P. SUP. R. 65. To ensure that standards are meaningful and that jurisdictions are
complying with them, states must adopt some form of oversight organization.
238. See 1 THE SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 93, at 12 (noting that states that
do not have funds to establish a capital trial unit may consider setting up standards
instead).
239. Id. at 11-12.
240. Bendavid, supra note 167, at i.
241. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 74, at 55-61.
242. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 217-19 (Minority Report of Stephen B.
Bright).
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all of the states that have adopted standards have followed the
ABA "experiential" model."3
To assess the potential effectiveness of such experiential stan-
dards, one must examne the permutations of these standards
that different states have developed. The major areas in which
the states differ are: whether they require one or two attorneys
for a capital case, whether the standards are accompanied by a
certification board or other organization to ensure compliance,
whether they cover only the appointment of counsel or extend to
performance of counsel as well, and the actual number of years
experience and the type of experience required.2"
Virgima, Indiana, and Ohio have not established capital trial
units within their systems, but they each have adopted a set of
standards for the appointment of counsel in capital cases."
Comparing these standards to the ABA guidelines demonstrates
some of the different approaches that have been taken in this
area.
The ABA standards are by far the strictest and most all-en-
compassing set of standards." s They cover the appointment of
counsel at trial, appeal, and during postconviction review, and
they outline performance requirements at all stages of the repre-
sentation. 7 The standards require that two attorneys be ap-
pointed to each capital case," that each jurisdiction establish
an "appointing authority" to ensure that the standards are com-
plied with, " and that each jurisdiction establish lists of at-
torneys qualified to serve as capital counsel." The standards
also include provisions relating to traimng, compensation,
243. See, e.g., IND. R. CRIM. P 24; OHIO C.P SUP. R. 65; Public Defender Commis-
sun Adopts Standards, supra note 230, at 8.
244. Compare IND. R. CRIM. P 24 with OHIO C.P Sup R. 65.
245. IND. R. CRiM. P 24; Public Defender Commisson Adopts Standards, supra
note 230, at 8; Telephone Interview with Sean Heasley, Assistant State Public De-
fender, Ohio Public Defender Office (Feb. 24, 1995) [hereinafter Heasley Interview].
246. Heasley Interview, supra note 245.
247. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 74, at 3-28.
248. Id. at 3.
249. The standards suggest that this should be an organized body, such as a public
defender commission or, in the alternative, that a committee of attorneys should be
appointed to adopt standards and procedures for the appointment of counsel m capi-
tal cases. Id.
250. Id. at 4.
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workload, and support services." Finally, they require trial
experience and some experience trying capital cases. 2
In contrast, state standards usually cover only the appoint-
ment of counsel and do not deal with matters such as perfor-
mance or compensationY3 Some state standards, such as those
adopted by Virgima, recommend, but do not require, that two
attorneys be appointed to every capital case.'
The state standards differ most dramatically from the ABA
gmdelines in regard to their requirements for attorney experi-
ence. The ABA guidelines require the lead counsel in a capi-
tal case to have at least five years of experience in criminal
defense litigation, prior experience in at least nine jury trials
of a serious and complex nature, of which at least three
should have been for murder or aggravated murder, and expe-
rience as counsel in at least one prior capital case. 5 The
guidelines also require the attorney to have attended and
completed a capital defense training program within one year
of his appointment. 6
Indiana adopts all of these requirements, except that counsel
need only have experience in five felony trials that were tried to
completion and counsel is only required to have completed a
training course within two years of appointmentY7 The Ohio
standards require lead counsel attorneys to have experience in
at least one prior capital case but are considerably less rigid in
the number of prior felony cases an attorney must have
tried." 8 An attorney can satisfy the standards if he acted as
lead counsel and completed one jury trial involving a murder or
251. Id. at 65-67, 73-83.
252. Id. at 4.
253. Compare OHIO C.P SUP. R. 65 (detailing requirements for appointment but
not outlining guidelines for performance once appointed) with ABA GUIDELINES, su-
pra note 74 (outlining both appointment standards and performance guidelines).
254. The standards state: "While Section 19.2-163.7 of the Virginia Code does
not require more than one attorney, the appointment of two attorneys is strongly
urged for trial, appellate and habeas proceedings." Public Defender Commisson
Adopts Standards, supra note 230, at 8.
255. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 74, at 5.
256. Id. at 6.
257. IND. R. CIlm. P. 24.
258. OHIO. C.P Sup. R. 65.
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aggravated murder charge." 9 Finally, under the Virginia stan-
dards, lead counsel must have five years of criminal litigation
experience, must have completed specialized capital defense
training within two years of the appointment, and must have
experience as lead counsel in a capital case, experience as co-
counsel in at least two capital cases, or experience as lead coun-
sel in five felony cases involving crimes that carry a mimmum
sentence of five years or more.50
Another important difference among state standards is the
type of organization by which the state monitors the appoint-
ment and performance of appointed counsel. Both Virginia and
Indiana have public defender commissions that maintain lists of
private attorneys eligible to try capital cases.2"' When a capital
case arises, the judge appoints an attorney from the list.26 2 In
Ohio, the public defender commission has created a committee of
attorneys to draft a similar list and has charged the committee
with the responsibility of reviewing the list periodically and
removing the names of attorneys who no longer meet the
qualifications. 3
Problems with Standards
Although standards are a means of ensuring the provision of
competent counsel to indigent defendants at the trial stage, the
adoption of such standards does not completely ensure that the
standards will be followed and that the quality of representation
will improve. Standards that are based solely on the number of
years the attorney has been in practice and that do not set up
an organization to recruit, train, and assign attorneys to capital
cases probably will not help to improve an indigent defense
system.2  Standards based on the number of years counsel has
259. Id.
260. Public Defender Commissin Adopts Standards, supra note 230, at 8.
261. IND. R. CRiM. P 24; Public Defender Commissin Adopts Standards, supra
note 230, at 8.
262. IND. R. CRIM. P 24; Public Defender Commission Adopts Standards, supra
note 230, at 8.
263. OHIo C.P SUP. R. 65 (III)(G).
264. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 217-19 (Minority Report of Stephen
B. Bright).
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practiced do not measure counsel's "actual ability to discharge
the responsibilities of defending a capital case."265
Instead of setting standards based on the number of years of
practice, the standards should require demonstrated knowledge
of death penalty law, litigation management skills, trial advoca-
cy skills, and knowledge and understanding of the guilt and
penalty phases of a capital trial.266 Without requiring such ac-
tual knowledge, an incompetent attorney who has tried several
criminal cases, either competently or incompetently, might satis-
fy the standards while a less experienced attorney well-versed in
capital case law and procedure may not qualify 2 7
Enforcement poses another potential problem. If no orgamza-
tion is set up to ensure that the standards are complied with, it
does not matter how strict they are.268 States must adopt pro-
cedures to ensure compliance with the standards.269
Improving Qualificatin Standards
Instead of focusing on attorney experience, qualification stan-
dards should focus on an attorney's knowledge of death penalty
law and trial advocacy skills.270 While experience should re-
main a factor in determining whether an attorney is qualified to
represent a death-eligible defendant, it should not be the only
factor. If experience is the only factor, then an attorney who has
represented countless death-eligible defendants incompetently
may qualify to continue representing them poorly, while a rela-
tively young attorney, who is very knowledgeable and competent
in death penalty law, would not be able to represent a death-
eligible defendant.2
Unlike current qualification standards that focus on the quan-
tity of experience and not the quality of the experience, knowl-
edge of death penalty law and procedure can be tested objective-
265. Id. at 217 (Minority Report of Stephen B. Bright).
266. Id. at 217-19 (Minority Report of Stephen B. Bright).
267. Bright, supra note 3, at 1871 n.209.
268. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 219 (Minority Report of Stephen B.
Bright).
269. Id. at 218-19 (Minority Report of Stephen B. Brght).
270. Id. at 217-19 (Minority Report of Stephen B. Bright).
271. Bright, supra note 3, at 1871 n.209.
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ly 272 Qualification standards should require attorneys to pass
a written exam testing their knowledge of death penalty law and
procedure. Tins requirement would ensure that all attorneys
representing death-eligible defendants understand the unique
and complex subtleties of death penalty jurisprudence and have
the knowledge necessary to represent their clients effectively
The test should be devised and administered by the organization
responsible for overseeing the certification of attorneys to repre-
sent indigent death-eligible defendants.27
In addition to testing the attorney's knowledge, the standards
should require an attorney to demonstrate competence in trial
advocacy skills.274 Although trial experience may be some mea-
sure of competence in trial advocacy, the umque bifurcated na-
ture of death penalty trials demands that attorneys understand
and appreciate the skills necessary to perform competently in
the penalty phase of the trial as well as in the guilt phase. To
ensure that attorneys have competent trial advocacy skills, they
should be required to attend and complete a training seminar on
trial advocacy in capital trials.275 At the conclusion of the ses-
sion, the attorneys should be required to engage in a mock capi-
tal trial to demonstrate competence in trial advocacy
Even if these improved standards are implemented and a
state establishes a satisfactory set of standards, it does not
necessarily follow that the system will improve. Judges might
be unwilling to follow such standards when selecting attorneys
or, in some areas, there might be no attorneys who qualify
under the standards.276 The differences in the strictness of
state standards can be attributed, in part, to difficulties in
272. One commentator has argued that the Sixth Amendment definition of counsel
should be narrowed to include only qualified counsel and has suggested that "courts
might test lawyers to determine whether they possess the requisite skill and knowl-
edge, just as candidates are now examined to receive a general license to practice
law." Green, supra note 34, at 510.
273. Id. at 507-15.
274. See zd.
275. See id.
276. "Despite the statutory guideline that attorneys appointed to capital cases must
have five years of experience, one attorney told the committee m Shreveport, that he
got his first capital case after he had been practicing 'for seven months.'" LOUISIANA
STUDY, supra note 133, at 32.
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attracting qualified volunteers to represent indigent capital de-
fendants for low pay277 Because attorneys often are reluctant
to represent capital defendants, excessively strict standards
may result in no qualified attorneys being available. 78 In
contrast, if the standards are too lax, they will not improve the
quality of representation.
That some counties or jurisdictions simply may not have qual-
ified attorneys who are willing to take the cases because of the
time and expense involved is a problem. 9 Even if some attor-
neys are qualified, there may not be enough to represent the
number of capital defendants in the area.2 0 All of these prob-
lems demonstrate that standards should not be the sole means
of adnumstering a system. Instead, they should be used in con-
junction with a capital trial unit system.
The Ideal System
The best system for ensuring that indigent death-eligible
defendants receive adequate representation is a combination of
capital trial units and qualification standards. Ideally, all states
with the death penalty should establish capital trial units con-
sisting of attorneys with specialized knowledge and experience
in capital cases. These units should be responsible for defending
all indigent death-eligible defendants in the state at trial and on
appeal.28' Tins system would ensure that all indigent death-
eligible defendants received adequate representation at the trial
level.
In addition, capital trial units should be responsible for devis-
ing qualification standards to be used in appointing attorneys in
277. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 196 (Minority Report of Malcolm M.
Lucas).
278. Id. at 197 (Minority Report of Malcolm M. Lucas).
279. Id. (Minority Report of Malcolm M. Lucas).
280. Id. (Minority Report of Malcolm M. Lucas).
281. Some existing capital trial units only represent indigent defendants if a public
defender or other qualified attorney is unavailable. See supra notes 164-92 and ac-
companying text. This process seems to defeat the purpose of having capital trial
specialists. Although situations may arise in which other attorneys may have to take
some capital cases, attorneys in the unit should represent indigent capital defen-
dants so that the defendants may benefit from the specialized knowledge and compe-
tence of the trial unit attorney.
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circumstances in which the unit has a conflict or when unit
attorneys are overloaded and unable to represent a defendant.
The qualification standards should focus on attorney knowledge
of death penalty law and procedure, experience, and trial advo-
cacy skills. 2 In addition to establishing standards, the capital
trial unit should be responsible for devising tests and exams,
conducting training seminars, certifying attorneys as qualified,
monitoring attorney performances in capital cases, and removing
attorneys who do not perform competently
The key to the effectiveness of this system is that it would be
organized and run by people with sp6cialized knowledge about
death penalty law and procedure. In contrast to present systems
in which appointed attorneys know little about the complex body
of death penalty law and procedure or in which attorneys are
appointed or certified by judges and public defender orgamza-
tions unfamiliar or unconcerned about the special nature of capi-
tal cases,' capital trial units would have the specialized
knowledge necessary to represent defendants, devise standards,
and monitor capital representation in the state."' Performing
.these narrow duties would be the sole function of the unit. The
responsibility for providing adequate defense to indigent capital
defendants should be focused in one place and not distributed
among the judiciary, the bar, and the state. While establishing
such a system does not guarantee the complete eradication of
ineffective representation, it should markedly improve repre-
sentation of indigent death-eligible defendants at the trial level.
ENCOURAGING STATES To ADOPT THIS SYSTEM
Although a number of states have adopted standards for the
appointment of counsel in capital cases or have established capi-
tal trial units, many states have made no attempt to reform
their systems. Whether these states will undertake any mean-
ingful reform unless they are required to do so is doubtful.'
282. See supra notes 260-70 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
285. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 221 (Minority Report of Stephen B.
Bright).
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Three main avenues of attack remain for reformers who wish to
encourage states to adopt the type of capital trial unit system
mentioned above. First, reformers can encourage Congress to
pass legislation requiring states to adopt such a system to en-
force the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the effective assistance
of counsel. Second, reformers can encourage Congress to pass
federal legislation providing funds to states on the condition that
they set up the desired indigent defense system, or they can
encourage Congress to pass legislation making the applicability
of certain beneficial provisions conditional on the states' adop-
.tion of the desired indigent defense system. Finally, if Congress
is reluctant to use its legislative power to enact these systems,
reformers can bring legal challenges against systems that do not
provide adequately for the appointment of competent counsel in
capital cases.
Federalism Concerns and Congressinal Actin
Under the Tenth Amendment, the constitutional powers not
expressly provided to the federal government are reserved for
the states.' The Supreme Court has struggled to define the
extent to which Congress can subject state governments to feder-
al laws. Most of the Supreme Court's decisions have involved
congressional attempts to enact regulatory programs under the
Commerce Clause. 7 These decisions provide a general illus-
tration of the federalism principles involved. In Garcia v. San
Antonw Metropolitan Transit Authority, 8 the Court held that
the Tenth Amendment does not bar Congress from passing gen-
erally applicable laws that bind the states." 9 In addition,
"Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds."29 Congress also may establish a federal regulatory pro-
gram and give states the option of regulating the activity in
accordance with federal standards or having the federal govern-
ment implement its program.29'
286. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
287. See infra notes 278-84 and accompanying text.
288. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
289. Id. at 554-57.
290. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
291. Hodel v. Virgima Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288
1996] 1659
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REvIEW [Vol. 37:1617
Recently, however, the Court has indicated that it may be
returning to its pre-Garcia understanding of the relationship
between the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. In
United States v. Lopez, 292 the Court held that Congress exceed-
ed its authority under the Commerce Clause when it passed the
Gun-Free School Zones Act."' The Court analyzed several fac-
tors in reaching its decision, one of which was the extent to
which Congress was intruding on an area traditionally con-
trolled by the states. 2' The Court thus appeared to revive the
analysis that it used in National League of Citzes v. Usery 295 It
is unclear after Lopez how much weight the Court will give to
this factor. Nevertheless, the decision demonstrates a willing-
ness to restrict Congress's broad Commerce Clause power.
One restriction on Congress's broad power under Garcia al-
ready exists. Despite Congress's broad power to regulate under
the Commerce Clause, it cannot "commandee[r] the legislative
processes of the states by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program."296 In New York v. Unit-
ed States, the Supreme Court struck down part of a federal law
requiring states to dispose of radioactive waste in accordance
with federal standards or take title to such waste because the
"take title" provision left a state government with no other alter-
native than that of implementing the federal legislation.297 The
Court noted that, "[wihile Congress has substantial powers to
govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate con-
cern to the States, the Constitution has never been understood
to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to gov-
ern according to Congress' instructions."
298
(1981).
292. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
293. Id. at 1630-34.
294. The Court appeared to be very concerned that a broad reading of the Com-
merce Clause nght allow Congress to regulate areas "where States historically have
been sovereign." Id. at 1632.
295. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
296. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981).
297. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176-77 (1992).
298. Id. at 162.
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These decisions demonstrate that Congress cannot force the
states to adopt legislation, even when it has the power to regu-
late the matters involved directly, under the Commerce Clause.
Any congressional attempt to force the states to adopt a specific
indigent defense system, however, should be founded on Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under Section Five, the
common federalism concerns raised above are not applicable. 9
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and Congressional
Implementation of More Effective Systems for the Defense of
Indigent Death-Eligible Defendants
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress
the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."' The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has been held to incorporate the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel, thus making it applicable to the states.'' Theoreti-
cally, Congress could pass legislation under Section- Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment calling for states to adopt more effec-
tive capital representation systems because the Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel applies to the
states through the Due Process Clause, and such legislation
would enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due
process." 2
Although Section Five traditionally has been used to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause, it also may be used to enforce in-
corporated rights.0 3 In Hutto v. Finney,"' the Court upheld
an award of attorney's fees to state prisoners that the court of
appeals ordered under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
299. See tnfra notes 285-321 and accompanying text.
300. Section Five states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 5.
301. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-45 (1963).
302. See Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional
Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1993) (discussing the use of Section Five to
enforce the First Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process
Clause).
303. See id. at 1053-60.
304. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
1996] 1661
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1617
Act of 1976."5 The court of appeals ordered the award after
the district court had declared the prison conditions unconstitu-
tional and had ordered the state to correct them.0 6 When the
state failed to do so, the court ordered the award of attorney's
fees as a further punitive measure.0 7
The state argued that the award was improper because it
violated the federalism principles embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment. 8' The Supreme Court ruled, however, that "the
Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty
which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforce-
ment provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."0 9 The
Court upheld the award of damages. 10
In Hutto, the Court thus used Section Five to allow a district
court to make an award of damages against a state to enforce
the Eighth Amendment, an incorporated right, pursuant to fed-
eral legislation. Justice Rehnqumst apparently understood the
Court's decision in this way because he noted in his dissent that,
[w]hile the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment
"incorporates" the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, it is not at all clear to me that it follows that
Congress has the same enforcement power under § 5 with
respect to a constitutional provision which has merely been
judicially "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment that
it has with respect to a provision which was placed in that
Amendment by the drafters. 1'
Despite Justice Rehnquist's views, the Court appears to have
sanctioned the use of Section Five to enforce incorporated rights.
Not only can Congress enforce incorporated rights with Section
Five, it also has the power to determine independently when
such enforcement is necessary "2 In the seminal case on Sec-
305. Id. at 689.
306. Id. at 684.85.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 689.
309. Id. at 702 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Blitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
310. Id. at 700.
311. Id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
312. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651-58 (1966).
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tion Five, Katzenbach v. Morgan,31 the Supreme Court held
that Congress had the authority under Section Five to pass
section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which invalidated a New
York literacy test as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. 14 The Court held that "§ 5 is a positive grant of legis-
lative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
deternmmng whether and what legislation is needed to secure
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.""'5 The Court
thus asserted that Congress can make its own assessment of the
reach of constitutional rights even if it is different than the
Court's assessment."6
To avoid the implication that Congress could restrict the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority noted,
in a footnote, that the power to "enforce" the Fourteenth
Amendment does not mean that Congress may "restrict, abro-
gate, or dilute" guaranteed rights.1 ' This footnote has given
rise to the "ratchet theory" of constitutional rights enforce-
ment.1 ' Under this theory, Congress may pass legislation ex-
panding the protections of the rights embodied in the Four-
teenth Amendment, but it may not restrict them. 9 Commen-
tators have debated at length whether the ratchet theory is a
defensible constitutional principle.Y
313. 384 U.S. 641.
314. Id. at 646-47.
315. Id. at 651.
316. See td.
317. Id. at 651 n.10.
318. Pawa, supra note 302, at 1062.
319. Id. It is unclear if there are limits on how far Congress may expand such
protections. Recently, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995),
the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), and held
that all racial classifications, including race-based presumptions passed by Congress
pursuant to its Section Five power, needed to be analyzed using strict, and not
intermediate, scrutiny, Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13. Although the majority ac-
knowledged that its members had different opinions on the power of Congress to use
Section Five to expand the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 2114, the dissent noted
that the majority opinion implied that Section Five could not be used to expand the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment unless there was an independent violation
of Section One, id. at 2126 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). If this is the case, it ap-
pears to limit Congress's power to "ratchet" up the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
320. Pawa, supra note 302, at 1062-64.
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Under Morgan, Congress not only has the power to use Sec-
tion Five to identify independently the reach of constitutional
rights, it also has the power to override principles of federalism
embodied in the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. In City of
Rome v. United States,21 the Court upheld a section of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 that required congressional pre-ap-
proval of state electoral changes that had discriminatory effects
even if they had no discriminatory purpose.3 22 An actual viola-
tion of constitutional rights thus does not have to occur before
Congress uses Section Five to enforce rights.3" A risk of a vio-
lation is enough." Furthermore, the Court commented on fed-
eralism concerns, noting that "principles of federalism that
nght otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are
necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the [Fourteenth
Amendment] 'by appropriate legislation.'"3"
For such legislation to be an "appropriate" use of Section Five
power, it must pass the three-prong test set forth by the Court
in Morgan.326 First, the statute at issue must "be regarded as
an enactment to enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment.327 Sec-
ond, the statute must be "plainly adapted" to the end of enforc-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment.3 28 Finally, the statute must be
"consistent with 'the letter and spirit of the Constitution.'329
Under the first prong of the Morgan test, as long as the Court
continues to adhere to its position in Hutto, legislation mandat-
ing the imposition of a specific indigent capital defense system
probably would be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, it
would be an enactment to enforce the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.
321. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
322. Id. at 163, 177.
323. Id. at 173-78.
324. See id. at 177.
325. Id. at 179.
326. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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Under the second prong, the statute must be "plainly adapted"
to enforcing the Sixth Amendment.3 30 The Court has stated
that Congress must show some basis upon which it has identi-
fied a need for the statute."' The Court stated: "[i]t is not for
us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is
enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Con-
gress might resolve the conflict as it did."332 To satisfy this
test, reformers and congressional members could introduce evi-
dence of the many instances of inadequate representation in cap-
ital cases that resulted from counsel's inexperience or incompe-
tence. This evidence should be enough to demonstrate to the
Court that Congress had a rational basis for enacting the en-
forcement legislation.
Finally, Congress must show that the legislation is "consistent
with 'the letter and spirit of the constitution" and not prohibited
by it. 333 Providing indigent capital defendants with the effec-
tive assistance of counsel is required by the Sixth Amendment
and thus is within the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Fur-
thermore, the legislation is not prohibited by the Constitution
because, under City of Rome, the Tenth and Eleventh Amend-
ments do not restrict the reach of Section Five legislation.334
Therefore, the legislation should pass muster under the third
prong.
Although Congress may well have the power under Section
Five to enact legislation imposing specific indigent capital de-
fense systems on the states, whether Congress will ever propose
such legislation is unclear. In the current political climate, such
legislation indeed seems very unlikely 35 Reformers should,
however, consider pursuing this option when the political cli-
mate improves.3 6
330. Id.
331. Id. at 653.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 651.
334. City of Rome v. United States, 466 U.S. 156, 179 (1980).
335. See supra notes 41-79 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's attempts
to restrict habeas corpus).
336. If Congress insists on eliminating federally funded Death Penalty Resource
Centers, reformers might be able to encourage Congress to pass legislation establish-
mg capital trial units while shifting the financial burden to the states and maintain-
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The Federal Spending Power
If reformers are unable to convince Congress to pass legisla-
tion requiring the states to implement more effective indigent
defense systems, they should attempt to encourage Congress to
use the federal spending power to reform state indigent defense
systems. Unless the Section Five argument is effective, Congress
cannot directly force the states to adopt an indigent defense
system due to federalism concerns."3 ' Congress can, however,
urge them to do so by attaching conditions to the receipt of fed-
eral funds or by making certain legislative provisions applicable
to states only if the states adopt the desired defense system.338
Congress could pass legislation providing that states that
adopted the capital trial unit system would receive additional
funds for federal prisons or for law enforcement. 39 Congress
has already demonstrated its willingness to condition the appli-
cability of habeas corpus reform provisions on the state's adop-
tion of mechanisms for providing counsel to indigent capital
defendants.340 Unfortunately, the House of Representatives
did not make the applicability of the habeas reforms condition-
al on the establishment of a trial system but rather on the
establishment of a system for the appointment of postconviction
counsel."
Although congressional urging may be an effective method of
obtaining reform, several commentators have criticized this
"carrot-and-stick" approach.342 Opponents of the death penalty
mg a state source of expertise m capital defense.
337. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166, 188 (1992) (holding that,
although Congress cannot compel states to adopt a federal regulatory program, it
can "urge" them to do so); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (holding that Congress cannot take over the legislative
processes of the states "by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program").
338. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that Congress
can attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds as long as the conditions are
not unconstitutional and there is a nexus between the conditions and the funds).
339. Note, supra note 29, at 1938 n.146.
340. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
342. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 195-98 (Minority Report of Malcolm
M. Lucas); Berger, supra note 2, at 1686.
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argue that the carrot-and-stick approach allows states to "buy"
special habeas provisions, such as tune limits on habeas review,
in exchange for giving indigent defendants rights that they
should have received anyway 43 By conditioning the applicabil-
ity of habeas reforms on the adoption of a state indigent defense
system, the system may devolve into a "two-tier" system with
two types of habeas provisions applying to complying and non-
complying states.3" This result would further complicate habe-
as corpus proceedings. 5
This approach also has been criticized as too intrusive on the
states because it requires them to "expend their limited reve-
nues on federal projects winch are not constitutionally mandat-
ed."" Furthermore, some opponents have argued that the
federal courts will be distracted from reviewing cases on the
merits during the habeas process because they will be busy
determining whether the states have complied with the opt-m
provisions.3 7
The arguments against the use of habeas corpus procedures
as the "carrot" to encourage states to adopt new indigent defense
systems are well founded. In contrast, conditioning the receipt of
funds on the implementation of a capital trial unit system does
not seem to pose the same two-tier system problem that using
habeas reforms as the "carrot" creates. Despite the theoretical
possibility of using such a "carrot-and-stick" approach, in the
recent political atmosphere, it seems very unlikely that Congress
will increase funding for prison or law enforcement contingent
on the reform of indigent defense systems.' In the current po-
litical climate, reformers should focus on attacking inadequate
defense systems in the judicial branch.
343. Berger, supra note 2, at 1686.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 196 (Minority Report of Malcolm M.
Lucas).
347. See id.
348. Indeed, although the House used such an approach m the Effective Death
Penalty Act, it refused to adopt a specific trial-level plan. The House rejected such a
plan. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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Legal Challenges to Inadequate Indigent Defense Systems
Legal challenges to indigent defense systems have met with
limited success."49 Litigation against indigent defense systems
primarily has been based on the theory that inadequate com-
pensation and overwhelming caseloads violate a defendant's
right to the effective assistance of counsel .3 " Although a num-
ber of these cases have been rejected, courts have shown a will-
ingness to consider systemic challenges and to fashion some sort
of remedy 3 51
In a series of cases in Arkansas, state prisoners sued the state
prison system, alleging that harsh and oppressive prison condi-
tions violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual pumshment.3 52 The district court ruled that condi-
tions were unconstitutional and established recommendations
for the State to follow in improving the conditions. 353 The State
did not act immediately to correct the conditions, and the court
held numerous hearings on the prison conditions and continued
to supervise the State's reform efforts from 1969 until 1977 "
The purpose of the reform was clear-the court was attempting
to ensure that the constitutional violations were eliminated.355
349. Bright et al., supra note 120, at 10; Klein, supra note 118, at 363.
350. Bright, supra note 120, at 12, 47; Klein, supra note 118, at 426; see, e.g.,
Wallace v. Kern, 392 F Supp. 834, 848-49 (E.D.N.Y.) (ordering a new system for the
assignment of counsel to indigents after challenge by an attorney), vacated, 481 F.2d
621 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974); State v. Smith, 681 P.2d
1374, 1381 (Ariz. 1984) (en bane) (holding that the indigent defense system was
inadequate due to overwhelming caseloads); Madden v. Township of Delran, 601 A.2d
211, 212 (N.J. 1992) (involving an attorney's challenge to an indigent defense system
structure that required him to represent indigent defendants for no pay).
351. See Wallace, 392 F Supp. at 848-49; Madden, 601 A.2d at 218 (ordering a
new system for the assignment of counsel to indigents after challenge by an attor-
ney).
352. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F Supp. 362, 364 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (Holt 1), affd, 442
F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd sub non. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505
F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974), affd sub non. Hutto v. Finney, 434 U.S. 901 (1977); Holt
v. Sarver, 300 F Supp. 825, 826 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (Holt 1).
353. Holt II, 309 F Supp. at 382-85.
354. Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 253 (E.D. Ark. 1976), affd, 548 F.2d 740
(8th Cir. 1977), affd, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F Supp. 194, 197
(E.D. Ark. 1973) (Holt III); Holt II, 309 F Supp. at 382-85.
355. The court stated:
Let there be no mistake in the matter; the obligation of [the State] to
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Although it may be more difficult to show that capital defen-
dants are not receiving their constitutional right to counsel than
it is to show that prisoners are being treated in a cruel and
unusual manner, these cases raise the hope that a court Might
supervise the imposition of a more effective indigent defense
system for capital defendants.
Another systemic challenge arose in State v. Smith.56 In
Smith, a defendant appealed a conviction in part on the grounds
that he was demed the effective assistance of counsel because
his attorney had an unworkable caseload.35' The Arizona court
found that the indigent defense system violated the defendant's
state and constitutional rights to due process. 8' Instead of
fashiomng a sweeping systemic remedy, however, the court
ruled that, until the system was reformed by the legislature,
there would be a rebuttable presumption of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in all cases tried under the system. 59 In re-
sponse to the ruling, the county started spending more money on
indigent defense, and overall representation improved.6 °
Although Smith and the Holt cases demonstrate that there is
hope in challenging systemic problems, to implement any perma-
nent change, a court must be willing to fashion a systemic reme-
dy Unfortunately, courts have been reluctant to get involved in
the restructuring of indigent defense systems even though they
are more qualified to restructure these systems than other sys-
tems that they have changed in the past.36'
eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not depend upon what the
Legislature may do, or, indeed, upon what [the State] may actually
be able to accomplish. If Arkansas is going to operate a Penitentiary
System, it is going to have to be a system that is countenanced by the
Constitution of the United States.
Holt H, 309 F. Supp. at 385.
356. 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc).
357. Id. at 1378-79.
358. Id. at 1381.
359. Id. at 1384.
360. Caroline A. Pilch, Note, State v. Smith, Placing a Limit on Lawyer's Case-
loads, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 759, 767 (1985).
361. The Supreme Court actively has encouraged the intervention of the courts in
the past when "the admimstration of a government function was found to operate in
a violation of the constitutional rights of some citizens." See Klein, supra note 118,
at 424. Most judicial intervention has occurred in school desegregation cases. See,
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In 1988, the Eleventh Circuit seemed ready to participate in
the restructuring of the Georgia indigent defense system, when,
in Luckey v. Hams,62 it reversed a district court ruling that
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for which relief could be
granted."8 The plaintiffs had sought a structural injunction to
compel the indigent defense system to comply with the Sixth
Amendment." Unfortunately, the case was later dismissed on
abstention grounds."
Although Luckey was dismissed, the use of a structural in-
junction to force a system to reform still seems to be a poten-
tially viable weapon.366 The structural injunction is a remedial
tool that allows a court to supervise the reconstruction of a
state institution to ensure that it complies with the Constitu-
tion. 67 It has been used in the past to reform schools, prisons,
and mental hospitals," and it seems that a court would be
even better suited to supervise the reconstruction of the defense
system.3
69
If such a challenge were successful, a court could declare the
indigent defense system unconstitutional and issue a set of
guidelines mandating the imposition of capital trial units and
standards for the appointment of counsel in capital cases. °
This was the approach followed in the Holt cases and in State v.
Smith. Although courts may be unreceptive to these challenges
at this time, by filing these suits, reformers can make others
aware of the problems in the indigent defense systems and can
e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Court inter-
vention in state indigent defense systems, however, seems even more appropriate
than intervention in school systems because indigent defense systems are legal rnsti-
tutions and courts have special expertise in this area, making them better qualified
to oversee reform efforts effectively. See Rodger Citron, Note, (Un)Luckey v. Miller:
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take an active and aggressive role in the advocacy of systemic
changeY
1
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment proclaims that all criminal defendants
shall have the right to counsel which, in turn, the Supreme
Court has held to mean the right to effectwe assistance of coun-
sel. To comply with this mandate, states have implemented
systems to provide indigent criminal defendants with counsel.
That these systems are underfunded and inadequate is widely
recognized. Congress, however, is seeking to curtail habeas cor-
pus review of death penalty cases based on the premise that
such reviews waste time and money The federal government
and state and local governments are eager to be hard on crime
but are reluctant to appropriate money to provide for indigent
defense systems. Due to the expansion of the number of death-
punishable offenses and the irreversible nature of the death
penalty itself, indigent defense systems must find specialized
means of providing indigent capital defendants with adequate
representation. Although funding is the key-and is sorely lack-
ing-states can make systemic changes that will result in better
representation. By including standards relating to the qualifica-
tion of private attorneys to represent indigent defendants and by
assembling capital trial units within an existing public defender
system, the states can provide better representation to capital
defendants and begin satisfying the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment.
Michael D. Moore
371. See Klein, supra note 118, at 432.
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